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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN P. SHUPE, 
Claimant-Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 890158-CA 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL Category 6 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and LES OLSON 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
J u r i s d i c t i o n over t h i s P e t i t i o n f o r Review is confer red 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals by § 3 5 - 4 - 1 0 ( i ) , Utah Code Anno-
t a t e d 1953, as amended, and § 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) ( a ) , Utah Code Annotated 
1953 (1987 Replacement Volume). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented in this case are whether the decision 
of the Board of Review that Claimant John P. Shupe was discharg-
ed by Les Olson Company for just cause within the meaning of 
§35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (hereafter 
also the "Act") is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the Board of Review, that is supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record, and whether the conclusions of the 
Board of Review, i.e., the application of the findings of basic 
facts to the legal rules governing the case, fall within the 
limits of reasonableness and rationality as per the intermedi-
ate standard of review applicable in this administrative pro-
ceedi ng. 
STATUTES AND RULES APPLICABLE TO THE CASE 
The following statutes and rules, which are determinative 
in this matter, are set forth verbatim in Appendix A: 
§35-4-5(b)(l), U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Rule R475-5bl-l, Unemployment Insurance 
Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security (Utah Administrative 
Code 1987-1988). 
Rule R47 5-5b1-2 , Unemployment Insurance 
Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security (Utah Administrative 
Code 1987-1988). 
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Rule R475-5bl-7, Unemployment Insurance 
Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security (Utah Administrative 
Code 1987-1988). 
Rule R475-5bl-8, Unemployment Insurance 
Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security (Utah Administrative 
Code 1987-1988). 
§35-4-5(b) (2), U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Rule R475-5b2-5, Unemployment Insurance 
Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security (Utah Administrative 
Code 1987-1988). 
§35-4-10(1), U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
§63-46b-16(4), U.C.A. (1988 Replacement 
Volume). 
§63-46b-16(4)(d), U.C.A. (1988 Replace-
ment Volume). 
§63-46b-16(4)(g), U.C.A. (1988 Replace-
ment Volume). 
§78-2a-3(2)(a), U.C.A. 1953 (1987 Re-
placement Volume). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After being discharged from his employment at Les Olson 
Company, Claimant-Petitioner John P. Shupe (hereafter also 
"Shupe" or "claimant") filed a claim for unemployment benefits 
effective October 2, 1988. On October 28, 1988, the Utah De-
partment of Employment Security issued its determination that 
Shupe was ineligible to receive benefits because he had been 
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discharged from his employment with Les Olson Company (here-
after also "employer"), for just cause, within the meaning of 
§35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (see Appen-
dix B ) . 
Shupe filed an appeal and on November 21, 1988 a hearing 
was held before an Administrative Law Judge (hereafter also 
" A L J " ) . In a decision dated November 29, 1988, the ALJ affirm-
ed the Department's earlier determination (see Appendix C ) . On 
December 8, 1988, Shupe, through his attorney, Utah Legal Serv-
ices, filed a further appeal to the Board of Review (hereafter 
also "Board"), On February 17, 1989 the Board of Review affirm-
ed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (see Appendix D ) . 
Shupe then filed his Petition for Writ of Review with the 
Utah Court of Appeals on March 20, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The claimant worked full time as a service technician for 
Les Olson Company from October 7, 1985 to September 26, 1988. 
Record at page 19. ("R" hereafter; all pages of the record 
referred to herein are set forth in Appendix E.) The claimant's 
job entailed going to various businesses to repair copy ma-
chines. R. 17 In the performance of his job the claimant met 
and interacted with company customers on a daily basis. R. 20 
In October 1987 the claimant propositioned a fourteen year 
old donut sales boy for sex. This action occurred on the 
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employer's property. The father of the boy complained to the 
employer. The claimant was discharged as a result of this 
action. The claimant pled for his job and the employer rein-
stated the claimant under three very stringent conditions: 
first, that he receive professional counselling; second, the 
claimant was placed on probation for 90 days that in the event 
of any act of misconduct it would result in immediate termina-
tion; third, if any act that even resembled this type of inci-
dent occurred again in the future, claimant would be terminated 
immediately. R. 21-22 The claimant underwent counselling up 
until the time of his termination in September 1988. R. 24 He 
also passed the 90 day probation. 
A few weeks prior to September 14, 1988, the claimant was 
charged by law enforcement officials for the crime of solicita-
tion for sex or prostitution. The basis for this charge was an 
incident that occurred on State Street in Salt Lake City during 
the claimant's lunch hour. The claimant received a subpoena to 
appear in court to enter a plea to the charge on September 14, 
1988. The claimant asked the employer for time off work giving 
the excuse that he had to appear in court as a witness. R. 23 
The employer asked the claimant if he wished to discuss the mat-
ter. The claimant replied "No." R. 20 The employer granted 
the claimant's request. The claimant went to court as directed. 
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It was closed for a seminar. He went to the administrative 
offices and asked what he should do. He was told to call the 
court the next day and ask for another court date. The claim-
ant did not follow the instruction and did not recontact the 
court to set up a new date to appear to enter a plea. R. 23 
On September 26, 1988 the claimant was arrested at work 
for failing to appear in court as directed. On the same date, 
September 26, 1988 the court sent a letter to the claimant 
advising him that he was subject to arrest due to his failure 
to appear before the court and enter a plea. The claimant did 
not receive this letter until September 28, 1988 — two days 
after he had been arrested. After being arrested on Septem-
ber 26, 1988, the claimant called the employer on the phone. 
He informed the employer that he had been arrested and explain-
ed the circumstances. R. 19 When he returned to work later 
that day he was discharged. At the time the claimant was 
notified that he was discharged, the employer explained the 
reason was an accumulation of things, the main reason being 
that the claimant had not been honest with the employer about 
what had happened and that the claimant could not be trusted 
with company property or with dealing with customers in a 
proper manner. R. 20, 22 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The judicial standards of review set forth in §63-46b-16(4) 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) have superceded 
the judicial standards of review set forth in §35-4-10(i) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act (UESA). The Utah Court of 
Appeals in the case of Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review 
noted that the "substantial evidence" test under §16(4)(g) of 
UAPA grants appellate courts greater latitude in reviewing the 
record than was previously granted under the "any evidence of 
substance" test of UESA. In applying the "substantial evidence" 
test the court reviews the whole record before the court. In 
so doing, a court must consider not only the evidence support-
ing the Board's factual findings, but also the evidence that is 
contrary to the Board's factual findings. A party challenging 
the Board's findings of fact must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, in light of the conflicting evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
The existing intermediate standard for reviewing the 
Board's determinations as described in the Administrative Serv-
ices case is consistent with §63-46(b)-16(4)(d) of UAPA. The 
intermediate standard of review has therefore not been changed 
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and continues to be the law and the appropriate standard of 
review under UESA as modified and supplemented by the enactment 
of UAPA. 
POINT II 
§35-4-5(b)(2) pertains to a situation where a claimant is 
discharged by an employer for dishonesty constituting a crime 
in connection with the claimant's work. An example would be 
theft or embezzlement of property belonging to the employer. 
Technically speaking, the phrase "not constituting a crime" in 
§5(b) (1) only applies to the second standard for discharge 
under §5(b)(1). In other words, the phrase "not constituting a 
crime" modifies the language "for an act or omission in connec-
tion with employment . . . which is deliberate, willful, or 
wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest . . ." 
It does not modify "just cause". 
The language "not constituting a crime" is used in §5 (b) 
(1) only for the purpose of distinguishing it from § 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) . 
§5(b)(2) has a very limited application. In the instant case 
the crime of soliciting or patronizing a prostitute does not 
fit within the narrow guidelines of §5(b)(2). It does not 
involve dishonesty in connection with the work of the claimant 
of repairing copy machines. Since §5(b)(2) cannot be the 
applicable disqualifying provision of the statute, the facts in 
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the instant case must fall under the disqualification provided 
in §5(b)(l) of the Act. 
POINT III 
There were four incidents in the instant case that are so 
interrelated that they must be jointly considered for the pur-
pose of applying the "in connection with employment test" of 
§5(b)(1) of the Act and Unemployment Insurance Rules interpret-
ing said section. The first incident occurred in October 1987. 
The claimant had propositioned a fourteen year old donut boy 
for sex on the employer's property. The employer immediately 
discharged the claimant. The claimant persuaded the employer 
to reinstate the claimant as an employee under three yery 
stringent conditions. The third condition was that in the 
event of any incident occurring in the future that even resem-
bled the incident with the fourteen year old donut boy that the 
claimant would be terminated immediately. 
The second incident--the solicitation incident on State 
Street in and of itself might not be sufficient to satisfy the 
"in connection with employment" requirement of §5(b ) ( 1 ) ; how-
ever, this incident is strongly coupled with the previous inci-
dent involving the fourteen year old donut salesman. Claimant 
knew that the solicitation incident on State Street was the 
sort of thing he had been warned about the year before. 
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The third incident when the claimant lied to the employer 
regarding the reason he had to appear in court on September 14 
was in connection with employment. The lie is not material 
except as it relates to and is coupled with the first incident 
involving the fourteen year old donut boy. The claimant demon-
strated to the employer that he would lie to the employer re-
garding a legitimate inquiry of the employer as to the reason 
why the claimant had to take time off from work. The fourth 
incident when the claimant was arrested on the employer's 
property in and of itself would not justify a denial of bene-
fits under §5(b) (1) except that it is a part of this whole train 
of events which when taken together satisfy the "in connection 
with employment" requirement of § 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) . 
POINT IV 
A. CULPABILITY FACTOR 
The culpability factor essential for a determination of in-
eligibility under §5(b)(1) of the Act has been satisfied in the 
instant case. The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/ 
employer relationship. The claimant was discharged because the 
employer could not trust the claimant to tell the truth and could 
not trust him to behave appropriately with customers as regards 
suggestions of a sexual nature and solicitation for sex. The 
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Board properly concluded this to be just cause for discharge 
under §5(b)(1) of the Act and applicable Unemployment Insurance 
Rules. The accumulation of incidents in the instant case all 
taken together and jointly considered satisfy the culpability 
factor. The conclusion of the Board of Review in this regard 
falls within the limits of reasonableness and rationality as 
per the intermediate standard of review applicable in this 
administrative proceeding. 
B. KNOWLEDGE FACTOR 
The best indication of what the claimant subjectively 
understood the employer warning to mean by the language "any 
act that even resembled this type of incident" was the incident 
that occurred on September 14, 1988 when the claimant lied to 
the employer regarding the reason why he had to appear in 
court. The evidence supports the finding that the claimant 
lied because he knew that his actions in soliciting sex on 
State Street were in contravention of the third condition of 
the warning issued by the employer and that under the terms of 
the warning he was in jeopardy of losing his job if the employ-
er became aware of the pending prosecution for solicitation. 
Under the the applicable Unemployment Insurance Rule it was 
not necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to the 
employer, but he certainly reasonably should have been able to 
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anticipate a discharge as a result of his actions under all of 
the facts and circumstances of this case. The conclusion of 
the Board of Review that the knowledge factor was satisfied in 
the instant case falls within the limits of reasonableness and 
rationality as required by the intermediate standard of review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING A DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW, 
THE COURT WILL APPLY THE STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW SET FORTH IN SUBSECTION 63-46b-16(4) OF 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
With the passage of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA), the judicial standards of review set forth in 
§63-46b-16(4) of the UAPA have superseded the judicial stan-
dards of review set forth in §35-4-10(i) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act (UESA). Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
110 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah App. June 2, 1989). 
§63-46b-16(4) of the UAPA provides as follows: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's re-
cord, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially pre-
judiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, 
is unconstitutional on its face or as 
appli ed; 
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(b) the agency has acted beyond the juris-
diction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action 
were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualifi-
cation; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion dele-
gated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; 
or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, supra, is the 
first case in which a Board of Review decision has been review-
ed by the Court of Appeals under the UAPA standards of review. 
The Court in Grace noted certain changes in the standard of 
-13-
review under UAPA from what had previously been the standard of 
review under UESA. The Court in Grace noted that the "substan-
tial evidence test" under §16(4) (g) of UAPA grants appellate 
courts greater latitude in reviewing the record than was pre-
viously granted under the Utah Employment Security Act's "any 
evidence of substance test." By way of further explanation 
and exposition, the Court noted that "substantial evidence" is 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence, though something less 
than the weight of the evidence. Substantial evidence is 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. The Court further noted that 
in applying the "substantial evidence test," the Court reviews 
the whole record before the court, and this review is distin-
guishable from both a de novo review and the "any competent 
evidence" standard of review. Moreover, under the "whole 
record test" a Court must consider not only the evidence sup-
porting the Board's factual findings, but also the evidence 
that fairly detracts from and is contrary to the Board's fac-
tual findings. 
The Court further stated a new concept not formerly made a 
requirement incumbent upon a party challenging the Board's find-
ings of fact and that is that such a party: 
must marshall all of the evidence support-
ing the findings and show that despite the 
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supporting facts, and in light of the con-
flicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
The Court then stated what appears to be a similar rule to 
what the courts have followed in the past in regard to unemploy-
ment insurance cases, that is: 
In undertaking such a review, this court 
will not substitute its judgment as between 
two reasonably conflicting views, even 
though we may have come to a different con-
clusion had the case come before us for 
de novo review. (cases cited) It is the 
province of the Board, not appellate 
courts to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the Board 
to draw the inferences, (case cited) 
The Board of Review understands the foregoing to be the standard 
of review under the recently enacted Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act as interpreted by the Court in the Grace case supra. 
In the case of Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Re-
view, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (Utah App. June 2, 1 9 8 9 ) , the Utah 
Court of Appeals had occasion to address the standard of review 
in regard to mixed questions of law and fact under the UAPA. 
The Court noted that: 
. . . Whether an employee was terminated 
for "just cause" is a mixed question of law 
and fact, and thus on appeal we must deter-
mine whether the UAPA alters the standard 
for reviewing such a determination. . . . 
The Court further noted that: 
-15-
Prior to the UAPA, our courts uniformly 
applied an intermediate standard of reason-
ableness and rationality in reviewing mixed 
questions of law and fact, otherwise refer-
red to as the application of "basic facts 
. . . to the legal rules governing the 
case." Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm,n>"T5"5 P.2d 601, £10 (UtaTf 
1 9 8 3 ) . Under the intermediate standard the 
Board's conclusions must be reasonable and 
rational "as measured against the language 
and purpose of the governing legislation." 
The Court then concluded that the existing intermediate standard 
for reviewing the Board's determinations as described in the 
Administrative Services case is consistent with the approach 
set forth in UAPA, §63-46b-16(4) ( d ) . The Court indicated it 
intends to continue to embrace the intermediate standard analy-
sis set forth in the Administrative Services case and that it 
would "not disturb the Board's application of its factual find-
ings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." 
The Board of Review concludes from the foregoing that the 
intermediate standard of review as originally set forth in the 
Administrative Services case and referred to in many subsequent 
cases arising under the Utah Employment Security Act has not 
been changed and continues to be the law and the appropriate 
standard of review under the Employment Security Act as modi-
fied and supplemented by the enactment of the Utah Administra-
tive Procedures Act. 
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POINT II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND BOARD OF REVIEW 
PROPERLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-
4-5(b)(l) IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE 
CLAIMANT WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS. SECTION 
35-4-5(b)(2) WAS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
§§35-4-5(b)(l) and 35-4-5(b)(2) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act, referred to above, provide as follows: 
5. An individual is ineligible for bene-
fits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliber-
ate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest, if so found 
by the commission, and thereafter until the 
claimant has earned an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly bene-
fit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
(b)(2) For the week in which he was dis-
charged for dishonesty constituting a crime 
in connection with his work as shown by the 
facts together with his admission, or as 
shown by his conviction in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction of a crime in connec-
tion with that dishonesty and for the 51 
next following weeks. If by reason of his 
alleged dishonesty in connection with his 
work, the individual is held in legal cus-
tody or is free on bail, any determination 
of his eligibility shall be held in abey-
ance pending his release or conviction. 
§35-4-5(b)(2) pertains to a situation where a claimant is 
discharged by an employer for dishonesty constituting a crime 
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in connection with the claimant's work. An example would be 
theft or embezzlement of property belonging to the employer. 
In order for this disqualification to apply there must be a 
conviction of the claimant for the crime in the appropriate 
court or there must be an unqualified admission on the part of 
the claimant that he committed all of the elements of that 
crime. The penalty imposed under this particular disqualifi-
cation is a very onerous one. It requires disqualification 
for the week the claimant was discharged and the 51 next 
following weeks. By way of comparison to § 5 ( b ) ( l ) , a claimant 
discharged under §5(b) (1) can purge the disqualification and 
become eligible for benefits by working at a temporary subject 
employment and earning an amount equal to at least six times 
the weekly benefit amount. 
§5(b)(l) presently provides that an individual is ineligi-
ble for benefits "for the week in which the claimant was dis-
charged for just cause or for an act or omission in connection 
with employment, not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful," etc. Prior to June 29, 1983, §5(b)(1) provided that 
an individual is ineligible for benefits "for the week in which 
the claimant was discharged for an act or omission in connec-
tion with employment, not constituting a crime, which is delib-
erate, willful," etc. The amendment of §5(b)(1) effective 
June 29, 1983, added the words "for just cause or". "Laws of 
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Utah", 1983 (1st S . S . ) , CH. 20. Technically speaking, the 
phrase "not constituting a crime" only applies to the second 
standard for discharge under §5(b)(1) which was the standard 
under the law prior to the amendment adding the "just cause" 
provision standard. In other words, the phrase "not consti-
tuting a crime" modifies the language "for an act or omission 
in connection with employment . . . which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful 
interest . . ." It does not modify "for just cause". 
However, for the sake of discussion, if the phrase "not 
constituting a crime" did apply in a situation involving a 
discharge for "just cause" it still would not prevent applica-
tion of §5(b)(1) in a case such as the instant case. The lang-
uage "not constituting a crime" is used in §5(b)(1) only for 
the purpose of distinguishing it from § 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) . As already 
mentioned, §5(b)(2) has very limited application. It only 
applies in the case of a conviction of a crime or the admission 
of the commission of a crime, which crime must involve dis-
honesty in connection with the work. When all of these ele-
ments are present the disqualification under §5(b)(2) applies. 
If all the elements are not present, then the disqualification 
under §5(b)(1) applies. This is the only logical construction 
of the phrase "not constituting a crime" in § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . This 
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conclusion is fortified by Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-
5b2-5.2, which provides: 
. . . if there is a preponderance of evi-
dence that the act was committed, a denial 
of benefits should be made under Section 
35-4-5(b) ( 1 ) , if charges have not been 
filed by the employer within four weeks. 
In such a case, the decision under Section 
35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that 
a decision under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) is 
still pending and the 5(b)(1) disqualifica-
tion will be changed to a 5(b)(2) disqual-
ification if the claimant is found guilty 
by the court. If the claimant has purged 
a 5(b)(1) disqualification which was or 
could be assessed pending a ruling by the 
court, benefits must be held in abeyance 
until the court reaches a verdict. The 
claimant has the responsibility to provide 
the Department with the court's verdict in 
order to establish eligibility. 
In the case of Clearfield City v. Department of Employment 
Security, 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) , the disqualification was 
assessed under §5(b)(1) of the Act because all of the elements 
were not satisfied so as to apply §5(b)(2). Sodomy did not 
come within the limitation that it must be a crime involving 
dishonesty in connection with the work. It therefore could 
not fit within the limited scope of §5(b)(2) and therefore 
§5(b)(l) applied. In the case of Lane v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Com'n, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , the claimant Lane was 
cited by the Parawan City Police for selling beer to a minor 
while acting in his capacity as assistant manager of a truck 
stop in Parawan. Again this act of selling beer to a minor 
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does not qualify as dishonesty in connection with the work and 
therefore it does not come within the narrow guidelines of 
§ 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) . Hence the disqualification under §5(b) (1) was ap-
plied. The Court reviewed the case under §5(b)(1) and finally 
determined that all of the elements necessary for a disqual-
ification under §5(b) (1) were not satisfied and concluded the 
claimant was not disqualified for benefits under § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . 
Benefits were allowed. 
In the instant case the crime of soliciting or patronizing 
a prostitute does not fit within the narrow guidelines of 
§ 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) . It does not involve dishonesty in connection with 
the work of repairing copy machines. Therefore, as in Lane 
and Clearfield City, §5(b)(2) cannot be the applicable disqual-
ification section of the statute and it must fall under the 
disqualification provided in §5(b ) (1) of the Act. 
In the Lane case the Court noted that the claimant was 
cited for the crime of selling beer to a minor. The decision 
does not disclose whether or not the claimant was ever convict-
ed of the crime. It was not necessary to determine whether the 
claimant was convicted or not in order to decide that §5(b) (1) 
applied. As noted above the crime of selling beer to a minor 
did not fit within the guideline of dishonesty in connection 
with the work required to come within §5(b)(2). Therefore, 
it was readily determined that §5(b)(1) applied without the 
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necessity for a verdict of guilty or innocent in a criminal 
court to determine whether §5(b)(2) applied. 
It is submitted that the "not constituting a crime" clause 
in §5(b)(1) of the Act must be read as though it expressly 
stated "not constituting a crime for which the claimant was 
disqualified for benefits under §5(b)(2) of this Act." 
POINT III 
THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT WAS SUFFICIENTLY CONNECT-
ED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT TO JUSTIFY A DENIAL OF UN-
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 35-
4-5(b)(l) OF THE ACT. 
The conduct of the claimant which was the basis for and 
cause of his discharge was first: the incident that occurred 
in October 1987, which involved a complaint by the father of 
a fourteen year old boy who sold donuts. The employer's wit-
ness testified that the claimant was very reluctant to discuss 
what had actually happened regarding the incident with the 
fourteen year old donut salesman until he realized that his job 
was on the line. At that point the claimant ". . . finally 
discussed what actually he had said . . ." R. 22 Based upon 
information received from the claimant and from the father of 
the fourteen year old donut salesman, the employer concluded 
that the claimant had propositioned the boy for sex on the 
employer's property. When the employer ascertained these facts 
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the decision was made to terminate the claimant. R. 21 The 
claimant "literally pled to the company for his job . . •" 
R. 21 The employer changed his mind and the claimant was rein-
stated as an employee provided that he strictly comply with 
three conditions imposed by the employer. The first condition 
was that "he receive counselling for it." The second condition 
was that the claimant "was placed on probation for 90 days 
that if any act of misconduct we indicated to him that he would 
be terminated." The third condition was a warning "that if any 
act that even resembled this type of incident occurred again in 
the future, he would be terminated immediately." R. 21 
The second incident which was the basis for claimant's 
discharge was the incident of solicitation for sex or prosti-
tution that occurred on State Street of Salt Lake City sometime 
prior to September 14, 1988. R. 23 This incident occurred 
during the claimant's lunch hour. At the time the claimant was 
not on the premises of the employer or of any customer of the 
employer. 
The third incident occurred at the employer's place of 
business on September 14, 1988. R. 20 At that time the claim-
ant requested time off from work to appear in court as a wit-
ness. The claimant lied to the employer in regard to the 
reason why he had to appear in court. The actual reason for 
his appearance in court was to enter a plea in the criminal 
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case referred to above, where he was the defendant. The fourth 
incident which was a basis for the discharge occurred on Septem-
ber 26, 1988 when the claimant was arrested in the company park-
ing lot in connection with the criminal charge already referred 
Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-7 defines the phrase 
"in connection with employment" as used in § 3 5 - 4 - 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) . It 
R475-5bl-7. In Connection with Employment 
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to of-
fenses which take place on the employer's 
premises or during business hours. It is 
only necessary that the conduct have such 
"connection" to the employee's duties and 
to the employer's business that it is a 
subject of legitimate and significant con-
cern to the employer. All employers, both 
public and private have the right to expect 
employees to refrain from acts which are 
detrimental to the business or would bring 
dishonor on the business name or the in-
stitution. Legitimate interests of employ-
ers include, but are not limited to: good-
will of customers, reputation of the busi-
ness, efficiency, business costs, morale 
of employees, discipline, honesty, trust 
and loyalty. 
This Rule is derived at least in part from the decision in the 
Clearfield City case supra, which provides: 
States with similar statutes have held that 
"connection with employment" is not limited 
to misconduct "which occurred during the 
hours of employment and on the employer's 
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premises." (Cases cited) It is only neces-
sary that the misconduct have such "connec-
tion" to the employee's duties and to the 
employer's business that it is a subject of 
legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer. 
The first incident referred to above as one of the bases 
for discharge involving the fourteen year old boy selling donuts 
occurred during the hours of employment and on the employer's 
premises. It was therefore clearly in connection with employ-
ment. The second incident--the solicitation for sex on State 
Street was unquestionably a matter of legitimate and signifi-
cant concern to the employer. The employer had previously dis-
charged the claimant over the incident involving solicitation 
of the fourteen year old boy because of the employer's yery 
real and understandable concern over the effect such actions 
would have on the goodwill of customers, the reputation of the 
business, the morale of the other employees, and the honesty 
and trustworthiness of the claimant. The employer, after much 
soulsearching decided to reinstate the claimant. In doing so 
the employer took steps to protect itself against further ac-
tions by the claimant that could adversely affect the reputation 
of the business, the goodwill of customers and the morale of 
the other employees. The employer required the claimant to 
obtain professional help (counselling) so as to avoid recurrence 
of such behavior. Also the employer sought to protect itself 
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from further damage by the claimant to its business interests 
by warning the claimant he would be immediately terminated in 
the event of any future act that even resembled the type of 
incident with the fourteen year old boy. This warning was 
given not so much to justify a future discharge of the claimant 
as it was given for the purpose of avoiding any respondeat 
superior liability and of deterring the claimant from doing 
acts that would be harmful to the goodwill of customers and the 
reputation of the employer and the employer's business inter-
ests in general. R. 22 
The solicitation incident on State Street in and of itself 
might not be sufficient to satisfy the "in connection with em-
ployment" requirement of § 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) • In this regard see Raymond 
0. Benaske v. General Telephone Company of Michigan and Michi-
gan Employment Security Board of Review, CCH Unemployment In-
surance Reporter, Mich. 119621; and Andrea L. Mason v. Board of 
Revi ew, CCH Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Pa. 1111814. The 
solicitation incident on State Street however is strongly 
coupled with the previous incident involving the fourteen year 
old donut salesman. The claimant had been given an ultimatum 
that any act in the future that even resembled the type of 
incident with the fourteen year old donut salesman would result 
in immediate termination. The claimant knew that the solicita-
tion incident on State Street was the sort of thing he had been 
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warned about the year before. The claimant's attorney in his 
opening statement said: 
. . • John lied to them. He told them that 
he was supposed to be there as a witness. 
And this doesn't justify that lie, John 
felt that this thing wasn't connected to 
his work and also, just the sort of social 
disapproval surrounding that sort of thing, 
especially a, com-, what had happened the 
year before, he had the feeling that he, 
that he would be fired if he told them, so 
he told them he was going to be there as a 
witness. R. 18 
It is the connection with the prior incident which clearly makes 
the solicitation incident on State Street an action "in connec-
tion with employment" pursuant to §5(b)(1) of the Act. 
The third incident when the claimant lied to the employer 
regarding the reason why he had to appear in Court on Septem-
ber 14, 1988 was in connection with employment. The purpose of 
the lie was not to obtain time off from work which he would not 
have been entitled to if he told the truth. If the claimant 
had told the supervisor that he needed time off because he had 
been ordered by the court to appear and enter a plea to a crim-
inal charge pending against him the employer would have been 
hard put to deny his request. So the lie is not material ex-
cept as it relates to and is coupled with the first incident 
involving propositioning the fourteen year old donut boy for 
sex. The purpose of the lie as already indicated was to avoid 
informing the employer that the claimant was again involved 
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with an unlawful solicitation for sex situation. The claimant 
thought the employer would consider it to be a violation of the 
third condition imposed by the employer at the time the employ-
er reinstated the claimant as an employee after having separat-
ed the claimant over the donut boy incident. The inescapable 
conclusion of the employer was that in spite of the profession-
al counselling which the claimant has received as a condition 
of reinstatement in employment, the employer could not trust 
the claimant to avoid further incidents of criminal solicita-
tion of sex. Furthermore, the employer could not trust the 
claimant to be honest with the employer as regards his involve-
ment in such activities as it related to the performance of 
the claimant's work duties. The claimant demonstrated that he 
would lie to the employer regarding a legitimate inquiry of the 
employer as to the reason why he had to take time off from work 
to cover up the fact of his involvement in an activity which 
was contrary to the third condition of continuing employment 
imposed by the employer. 
The fourth incident wherein the claimant was arrested in 
the company parking lot on September 26, 1988 was partly the 
fault of the claimant and partly the fault of the court. R. 23 
When the claimant appeared in court on September 14, he was 
informed he should call the court the next day to set a new 
date for him to appear to enter his plea. The claimant failed 
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to call the court the next day and acknowledged at the hearing 
that his failure to do so "was probably my, my single greatest 
mistake in this whole affair because if I had called and if I 
had set up another date, I could've probably taken care of this 
whole incident without involving my company or the police . . ." 
R. 25 The court then sent a letter to the claimant dated the 
same date that he was arrested, September 26, 1988, informing 
the claimant that because he had failed to appear in court 
that he was subject to arrest. The claimant received this 
letter two days later on September 28, two days after he was 
arrested. As noted by the claimant, he obviously had no chance 
to act on the letter from the court dated September 26. 
The presence of the officer on the employer's property was 
somewhat disruptive of the employer's operations. It caused 
considerable stir, talk and inquiry among the employees. The 
claimant's arrest and processing with the court took the claim-
ant away from work for a substantial part of the day and caused 
the employer disruption and inconvenience insofar as the claim-
ant's non-attendance resulted in such. As noted by the claim-
ant he could have avoided this whole episode of arrest at the 
place of his employment if he had not been involved in the 
solicitation on State Street in the first place and if he had 
called the court on the 15th of September to make an appoint-
ment for another date to appear as he had been instructed. 
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The arrest incident in and of itself would not justify a 
denial of benefits under §5(b)(1) of the Act. However, it is 
a part of this whole train of events which when taken together 
satisfy the "in connection with employment" requirement of 
§ 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) . It was his arrest which alerted the employer to the 
fact that the claimant had lied to him about the reason for 
his absence from work on September 14, and also the claimant 
was again involved in solicitation of sex in contravention of 
the condition of his reinstatement in employment instituted 
at the time of the donut boy incident. It is submitted that 
all of the foregoing incidents are so interrelated that they 
must be jointly considered for the purpose of applying the "in 
connection with employment" test of §5(b)(1) and Unemployment 
Insurance Rule R475-5bl-7, interpreting and defining this re-
qui rement. 
It is submitted in view of the situation as a whole it was 
proper for the ALJ and Board of Review to conclude that the 
claimant's actions were detrimental to the business or would 
bring dishonor on the business name. They adversely affected 
the goodwill of customers, the reputation of the business, the 
morale of fellow employees, and in the words of the Board of 
Review, "very substantially adversely affected the employer's 
ability to trust the claimant." R. 54 The conclusions of the 
ALJ and Board of Review are reasonable and rational as per the 
intermediate standard of review (see POINT I, s u p r a ) . 
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POINT IV 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW THAT THE 
CULPABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE FACTORS HAVE BOTH BEEN 
SATISFIED IN THE INSTANT CASE SUCH AS TO JUSTIFY 
A DENIAL OF BENEFITS UNDER §35-4-5(b) (1) OF THE 
ACT FALLS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASONABLENESS 
AND RATIONALITY AS REQUIRED BY THE INTERMEDIATE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW PERTAINING TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
The Respondent is in agreement with the statement in the 
Appellant's brief that the question of control is not at issue 
in the instant case and that only the culpability and knowledge 
factors are at issue in this case. The Respondent will address 
only the culpability and knowledge factors in its brief. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules interpreting §5(b)(l) of 
the Act, provide that: 
The basic factors which establish just 
cause, and are essential for a determina-
tion of ineligibility are: 
a. Culpability, b. Knowledge, and c. Con-
trol . 
A. CULPABILITY FACTOR. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-2.1.a. defines the 
culpability factor as follows: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or 
the severity of the offense as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. 
The discharge must have been necessary to 
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The ALJ in her decision held that the claimant's: 
. . • actions toward the fourteen year old 
and his subsequent citation for solicita-
tion shrouded the employer's ability to 
trust him to behave in a socially accept-
able manner* The employer's reason for 
discharge was that the company's trust 
level in the claimant had eroded. . . . 
Since the claimant's behavior shrouded the 
employer's trust, the company acted rea-
sonably by separating him. 
The Board of Review in affirming the decision of the ALJ 
also noted that the employer's inability to trust the claimant 
was the basis for the discharge and constituted "just cause" 
under §5(b)(l). The Board in its decision stated: 
. . . the claimant's actions toward the 
fourteen year old boy on the employer's 
premises, his subsequent citation for soli-
citation, and his failure to report to the 
employer that the reason he had to go to 
court was not to act as a witness but to 
appear as a defendant on a criminal charge 
of solicitation, \/ery substantially ad-
versely affected the employer's ability to 
trust the claimant. It affected the em-
ployer's ability to trust the claimant in 
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general and also to trust the claimant to 
behave in the future in a manner such as 
not to harm the reputation of the employer; 
or to harm the relationship of the employ-
er with its customers; or to possibly ren-
der the employer liable in damages for the 
claimant's misconduct directed toward cus-
tomers or other employees of the employer 
or other third parties dealing with the 
employer and coming in contact with the 
claimant. 
The Appellant, in its brief on page 12 refers to the case 
of Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 
1129 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) . The Kehl case involved transporting thousands 
of pounds of explosives over a train track without complying 
with the employer's safety rules prior to actually crossing the 
track with the explosives. Claimant notes that in Kehl the act 
of transporting the explosives over the train tracks in dis-
regard of the employer's safety policies: 
. . . shows a reckless disregard for the 
company rules and an imminent danger to 
human lives . . . Kehl's act could have 
cost her employer, Hercules, several hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, as well as 
cost Hercules its excellent reputation in 
the community. Shupe's conduct cost his 
employer nothing. (Brief of Appellant, 
page 13.) 
The claimant also refers to the case of Clearfield City v. 
Department of Employment Security, supra, on page 14 of its 
brief. In this case a policeman for Clearfield City also 
worked part time as a counselor at the Clearfield Job Corp 
Center which is located in the City of Clearfield. This 
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police officer engaged in an act of sodomy with a twenty-two 
year old female student at the Job Corp Center, The case was 
widely publicized in the community. 
It is not necessary that the potential damage to an em-
ployer be of such major ramification and involve the possible 
loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars and possible loss of 
human life and potential catastrophic devastation of property 
as in the Kehl case in order to satisfy the culpability factor 
under §5(b) (1) of the Act. Nor is it necessary that the offense 
of a claimant be so notorious and sensational as was the act 
of sodomy engaged in by the police officer in the Clearfield 
case in order to satisfy the culpability factor. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-8 sets forth several 
examples of reasons for discharge. The examples given which do 
not include all reasons for discharge, are: violation of com-
pany rules, attendance violations, falsification of work record, 
insubordination and loss of license. Attendance violations 
are certainly not as spectacular as the violations in the Kehl 
case and the Clearfield City case. However, they do constitute 
just cause. Rule R475-5bl-8.2 points out that: 
. . . Such violations [attendance viola-
tions] are generally a serious matter of 
concern to employers as attendance stan-
dards are necessary to maintain order, con-
trol, and productivity. 
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The "falsification of work records" example is the one 
most closely related to the instant case. It provides: 
The duty of honesty is inherent in any 
employee/employer relationship. A state-
ment made in an application for a job may 
be considered as connected with the work, 
even though it is made before the work 
begins. An individual begins his obliga-
tions as an employee when he makes an 
application for work. One of those obli-
gations is to give the employer truthful 
answers to all material questions. Any 
falsification of information which may 
operate to expose the employer to possible 
loss, litigation, or damage would be con-
sidered material and therefore may estab-
lish culpability. If the claimant made a 
false statement while applying for work in 
order to be hired, benefits may be denied, 
even if the claimant would have otherwise 
remained unemployed and eligible for the 
receipt of unemployment benefits depending 
upon the degree of knowledge, culpability 
and control . 
As the rule points out, the duty of honesty is inherent in any 
employee/employer relationship. It is the obligation of an 
employee to give the employer truthful answers to all material 
questions. The basis of both the ALJ's decision and the Board 
of Review's decision was the employer's inability to trust the 
claimant in general and also to trust the claimant to behave 
in the future in a manner such as not to harm the reputation 
of the employer or to harm the relationship of the employer 
with its customers or to possibly render the employer liable 
in damages for the claimant's misconduct directed toward 
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customers, other employees, or other third parties dealing with 
the employer and coming in contact with the claimant. 
As noted in POINT III the claimant demonstrated that he 
would lie to the employer regarding a legitimate inquiry of the 
employer as to the reason why he had to take time off from work 
in order to cover up the fact of his involvement in an activity 
involving solicitation for sex. The employer was concerned 
that the clamant goes out to service copiers and is around 
customers. They were worried about him making inappropriate 
comments while with customers. It was a serious matter of 
concern. R. 9 The employer could not trust the claimant to 
tell the truth and could not trust him to behave appropriately 
with customers as regards suggestions of a sexual nature and 
solicitation for sex such as what occurred with the fourteen 
year old donut boy and solicitation for sex and prostitution as 
occurred in the incident resulting in the filing of criminal 
charges. 
The rule regarding falsification of a work record also 
stresses that actions by an employee "which may operate to 
expose the employer to possible loss, litigation, or damage 
would be considered material and therefore may establish culp-
ability." That was one of the major concerns in the instant 
case. The employer's witness testified: 
. . . we didn't feel like we could afford 
the potential liability that we might have 
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because i f he was, i f t hese t ypes of ac t s 
were o c c u r r i n g a g a i n , we d i d n ' t know w h e t h -
er he m igh t be i n a c u s t o m e r ' s o f f i c e a t 
some p o i n t i n t i m e a n d , u h , do someth ing 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e t h e r e . We j u s t d i d n ' t f e e l 
l i k e we c o u l d t a k e t h a t l i a b i l i t y . . . . 
The employer t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t was sepa ra ted 
f o r 
. . . an accumulation of things, the main 
reason being that, uh, he wasn't honest 
with me about what had happened. . . . I 
just felt like if he'd lied to me about 
this kind of thing, what else might he lie 
to me about* , , ." R. 20 
The employer was referring to when the claimant lied that he 
had to appear in court as a witness. It was the combination of 
the four incidents referred to in POINT III that were the bases 
of the discharge and which altogether satisfied the culpability 
factor and constituted just cause for the discharge. The Court 
in Grinnell v. Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) , had 
before it a similar situation involving -m accumulation of 
causes giving rise to a discharge. The Court noted: 
The Board of Review reversed, finding that 
Grinnell was terminated for all of the pol-
icy violations and that the drug use was a 
violation that according to the employer 
"broke the camel's back". 
The Court in Grinnell held: 
Two witnesses for the employer testified 
that it was the cummulative affect of 
Grinnell's violations of company policy 
that led to his discharge, and the Board's 
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findings are therefore not arbitrary and 
capri ci ous. 
It is submitted that the instant case is in accord with 
the decision in the Grinnel 1 case. The accumulation of the 
incidents starting with the solicitation of the fourteen year 
old donut boy, the solicitation for sex or prostitution that 
occurred a year later, the lying to the employer to cover up 
the fact that the claimant had been charged in a criminal pro-
ceeding for the solicitation incident on State Street, and 
finally the incident when the claimant was arrested at work 
due to the fact that he had failed to reschedule a date for 
his appearance to enter a plea in the criminal case, all taken 
together and jointly considered satisfy the culpability factor. 
In any event it could not be said that the conclusion of the 
Board of Review that the culpability factor has been satisfied 
in the instant case does not fall within the limits of reason-
ableness and rationality as per the intermediate standard of 
review applicable in this administrative proceeding. (See 
POINT I, supra.) 
B. KNOWLEDGE FACTOR 
Unemployment Insurance Rule R 4 7 5 - 5 b l - 2 . 1 .b exp la ins the 
knowledge f a c t o r as f o l l o w s : 
- 3 8 -
b. Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of 
the conduct which the employer expected. 
It is not necessary that the claimant in-
tended to cause harm to the employer, but 
he should reasonably have been able to 
anticipate the effect his conduct would 
have. Knowledge may not be established un-
less the employer gave a clear explanation 
of the expected behavior or had a pertinent 
written policy, except in the case of a 
flagrant violation of a universal standard 
of behavior. If the employer's expecta-
tions are unclear, ambiguous or inconsis-
tent, the existence of knowledge is not 
shown. A specific warning is one way of 
showing that the employee had knowledge of 
the expected conduct. Ater the employee 
is given a warning he should be given an 
opportunity to correct the objectionable 
conduct. Additional violations occurring 
after the warning would be necessary to 
establish just cause for a discharge. 
The claimant contends on page 16 of his brief that when 
he was given the warning in 1987 as a result >f the n u i d p n t 
with the fourteen year old donut boy, there was no explanation 
given that any kind of solicitaton whatsoever, whether on 
company property or not, whether during working hours or not, 
or whether to a minor or not, would be reprehensible to the 
company. Therefore the claimant could not be expected to know 
that his nonwork-related conduct was violative of company 
pol i cy. 
By way of response to the foregoing contention ul the 
claimant, the employer testified that the claimant was warned 
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in regard to the donut boy incident that "if any act that even 
resembled this type of incident occurred again in the future, 
he would be terminated immediately." The question then is what 
did the claimant subjectively understand the employer to mean 
by "any act that even resembled this type of incident." The 
best indication of this is the incident that occurred on Sep-
tember 14, 1988 at the time the claimant requested time off 
from work to appear in court as a w i t n e s s . When asked why he 
had to go to court the claimant lied to the employer and did 
not disclose that he had been picked up and charged for soli-
citation of sex or prostitution. The claimant's attorney ex-
plained that the reason the claimant lied was that "he had the 
feeling that he, that he would be fired if he told them, so he 
told them he was going to be there as a witness." R. 18 (Also 
see POINT III, supra, page 2 7 ) . The claimant testified that he 
lied to the employer stating that he had to appear in court as 
a witness as follows: 
Now, when I went to court that day, I told 
my boss, Jim Olson, that I had to appear as 
a witness. Obviously, that's not true, but 
I said that because I didn't really want to 
tell him what was really going on because I 
felt that I could take care of it and it 
would be out of the way and no one really 
had to know about it. Urn, in hindsight, I 
almost, you know, could've just as easily 
said I had a doctor's appointment or some-
thing rather than have to explain why I 
have to go to court but I really didn't 
want to lie to them, you know, I, I felt 
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that, you know, having to go to court was 
a bad enough deal and for me to have to lie 
and say that I was doing something else 
would just be making it worse, so I told 
Jim I had to go to court but I said it was 
as a witness, R. 23 
The claimant in his appeal to the ALJ stated "I know I was 
half truthful in a matter involving a court appearance . . ." 
R. 11 The claimant does not specifically state why he lied to 
the employer. It seems clear that he felt it was necessary 
not to disclose to the employer the fact that he hac1 been 
involved in solicitation of sex or prostitution. The claimant 
wanted to keep his lies to a minimum and therefore he just lied 
about the reason he was to go to court rather than using the 
excuse he had a doctor's appointment which would h.ivo bncn a 
total lie rather than a half truth. The evidence supports a 
finding that the claimant lied because he knew that his actions 
in soliciting sex were in contravention of the third condition 
of the warning and that under the terms of the warning he was 
in jeopardy of losing his job if the employer became aware of 
the pending prosecution for solicitation. 
It is submitted that the various elements of the Depart-
ment rule pertaining to the knowledge factor have all been 
satisfied. The claimant knew that the ai t of solicitation 
which gave rise to the criminal proceeding against him was 
conduct which the employer had specifically warned him if would 
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not t o l e r a t e . As t h e D e p a r t m e n t Rule s t a t e s , it w a s not n e c e s -
sary that the c l a i m a n t i n t e n d e d to c a u s e harm to the e m p l o y e r 
but he c e r t a i n l y r e a s o n a b l y should have been able to a n t i c i p a t e 
a d i s c h a r g e as a r e s u l t of his a c t i o n s . The c o n c l u s i o n of the 
Board of R e v i e w and the ALJ that the k n o w l e d g e f a c t o r as set 
fort h in D e p a r t m e n t R u l e s was s a t i s f i e d in the i n s t a n t c a s e , 
f a l l s w i t h i n the l i m i t s of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s and r a t i o n a l i t y as 
r e q u i r e d by t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w e n u n c i a t e d in 
t h e Utah D e p a r t m e n t of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S e r v i c e s v. Publi c Serv-
ice C o m m i s s i o n c a s e , r e f e r r e d to in PO I N T I, s u p r a . , and held to 
be still a p p l i c a b l e u n d e r the Utah A d m i n i s t a t i v e P r o c e d u r e s Act 
in t h e P r o - B e n e f i t S t a f f i n g c a s e , also r e f e r r e d to in POINT I, 
s u p r a . 
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the Department of Employment Security, and precedent decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals. The deci-
sion should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
By 
Winston M. Faux 
Attorney for Respondents 
Board of Review 
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the fore-
going Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ward Harper, UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Attorney for the Peti-
tioner, John P. Shupe, 124 South 400 East, #400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 8 4 1 1 1 ; and Scott Olson, Les Olson Company, Employer-
Respondent, P. 0. Box 65677, Salt Lake City, Utah 84165-0677, 
this day of July, 1989. 
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APPENDIX A (Page 1) 
§35-4-5(b) (1) » Utah Code Annotated l*)5l, as amended, pro-
vides as follows: 
5. An individual is ineligible for bene-
fits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliber-
ate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
e m p l o y e e s rightful interest, if so found 
by the commission, and thereafter until the 
claimant has earned an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly bene-
fit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
Unemployment Insurance Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security, R475-5bl-l, R475-5bl-<?, R475-55 i - / dud R475-5bl-8 
provide in pertinent part as follows: 
R475-5bl-l. General Definition 
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are 
used in determining if a discharge is dis-
qualifying under the "just cause" provi-
sions of the Act. Just cause is defined as 
a job separation that is necessary due to 
the seriousness of actual or potential harm 
to the employer provided the claimant had 
knowledge of the employer's expectations 
and had control over the circumstances 
which led to the discharge. Just cause is 
not established if the reason for the dis-
charge is baseless, arbitrary or capricious 
or the employer has failed to uniformly ap-
ply reasonable standards to all employees 
when instituting disciplinary action. The 
purpose of this section is to deny benefits 
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R 4 7 5 - 5 b l - 2 . Just Cause 
1. The basic factors which establish just 
cause, and are essential for a determina-
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potential harm may not be shown and there-
fore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. 
b. Knowledge 
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establish just 
(1) For Example: When the employer has an 
established procedure of progressive dis-
cipline, such procedures generally must 
have been followed in order to establish 
that the employee had knowledge of the ex-
pected behavior or the seriousness of the 
act. The exception is that yery severe 
conduct, such as criminal actions, may 
justify immediate discharge without follow-
ing a progressive disciplinary program. 
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c. Control 
The conduct must have been within the power 
and capacity of the claimant to control or 
prevent. 
2. Just cause may not be established when 
the reason for discharge is based on such 
things as mere mistakes, inefficiency, 
failure of performance as the result of in-
ability or incapacity, inadvertence in iso-
lated instances, good faith errors in judg-
ment or in the exercise of discretion, 
minor but casual or unintentional careless-
ness or negligence, etc. These examples of 
conduct are not disqualifying because of 
the lack of knowledge or control. However, 
continued inefficiency, repeated careless-
ness, or lack of care exercised by ordin-
ary, reasonable workers in similar circum-
stances, may be disqualifying depending on 
the reason and degree of the carelessness, 
the knowledge and control of the employee. 
3. The term "just cause" as used in Sec-
tion 5(b)(1) does not lessen the require-
ment that there be some fault on the part 
of the employee involved. Prior to the 
1983 addition of the term "just cause" the 
Commission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to 
require an intentional infliction of harm 
or intentional disregard of the employer's 
interests. The intent of the Legislature 
in adding the words "just cause" to Section 
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this re-
strictive interpretation. While some fault 
must be present, it is sufficient that the 
acts were intended, the consequences were 
reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts 
have serious effect on the employee's job 
or the employer's interests. 
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R475-5bl-7. In Connection with Employment 
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to of-
fenses which take place on the employer's 
premises or during business hours. It is 
only necessary that the conduct have such 
"connection" to the employee's duties and 
to the employer's business that it is a 
subject of legitimate and significant con-
cern to the employer. All employers, both 
public and private have the right to expect 
employees to refrain from acts which are 
detrimental to the business or would bring 
dishonor on the business name or the insti-
tution. Legitimate interests of employers 
include, but are not limited to: goodwill 
of customers, reputation of the business, 
efficiency, business costs, morale of em-
ployees, discipline, honesty, trust and 
1oyalty. 
R475-5bl-8. Examples 
charge. 
of Reasons for Di s 
In all the following examples, the basic 
elements of just cause must be considered 
in determining eligibility for benefits. 
The following examples do not include all 
reasons for discharge. 
1. Violation of Company Rules 
If an employee violates reasonable rules 
of the employer and the three elements of 
culpability, knowledge and control are 
established, benefits must be denied. 
a. The reasonableness of the employer's 
rules will depend on the necessity for such 
a rule as it affects the employer's inter-
ests. Rules which are contrary to general 
public policy or which infringe upon the 
recognized rights and privileges of indi-
viduals may not be reasonable. An employer 
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must have broader prerogatives in regula-
ting conduct when employees are on the job 
than when they are not. An employer must 
be able to make rules for employee on-the-
job conduct that reasonably further the 
legitimate business interests of the em-
ployer. An employer is not required to 
impose only minimum standards, but there 
may be some justifiable cause for viola-
tions of rules that are unreasonable or 
unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting. When 
rules are changed, adequate notice and 
reasonable opportunity to comply must be 
afforded. If the employee believes a rule 
is unreasonable, he has the responsibility 
to discuss his concerns with the employer 
and give the employer an opportunity to 
take corrective action. 
b. Discharges may be regulated by an em-
ployment contract or collective bargaining 
agreement. Just cause for the discharge is 
not established if the employee's conduct 
was consistent with his rights under such 
contract or the discharge was contrary to 
the provisions of such contract. 
c. Habitual offenses may not be disquali-
fying conduct if it is found that the act 
was condoned by the employer or was so 
prevalent as to be customary. However, 
when the worker is given notice that the 
conduct will no longer be tolerated, fur-
ther violations could result in a denial of 
benefits. 
d. Culpability may be established even if 
the result of the violation of the rule 
does not in and of itself cause harm to the 
employer, but the resultant lack of compli-
ance with rules diminishes the employer's 
ability to have order and control. Culpa-
bility is e s t a b l i s h e d if termination of 
the employee was required to maintain nec-
essary discipline in the company. 
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e. Knowledge of the employer's standards 
of behavior is usually provided in the 
form of verbal i n s t r u c t i o n s , written rules 
and/or warnings. However, the warning is 
not always necessary for a disqualification 
to apply in cases of violations of a seri-
ous nature of universal standards of con-
duct of which the claimant should have been 
aware without being warned. 
2. Attendance Violations 
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b. In cases of termination for violations 
of attendance s t a n d a r d s , the employee's 
recent history of attendance shall be con-
sidered to determine if the violation is 
an isolated incident, or demonstrates a 
pattern of unjustified absences within the 
control of the employee. Flagrant misuse 
of attendance privileges may result in a 
denial of benefits even if the last inci-
dent was beyond the employee's control. 
3. Falsification of Work Record 
a. The duty of honesty is inherent in any 
employee/employer relationship. A state-
ment made in an application for a job may 
be considered as connected with the work, 
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even though it is made before the work 
begins. An individual begins his obliga-
tions as an employee when he makes an 
application for work. One of those obliga-
tions is to give the employer truthful 
answers to all material questions. Any 
falsification of information which may 
operate to expose the employer to possible 
loss, litigation, or damage would be con-
sidered material and therefore may estab-
lish culpability. If the claimant made a 
false statement while applying for work in 
order to be hired, benefits may be denied 
even if the claimant would have otherwise 
remained unemployed and eligible for the 
receipt of unemployment benefits depending 
upon the degree of knowledge, culpability 
and control. 
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5. L o s s of L i c e n s e 
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§ 3 5 - 4 - 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) , Utah Code Annotated JLJ5i» as amended, pro-
vides as f o l l o w s : 
5. An individual is ineligible tor bene-
fits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(b)(2) For the week in which he was dis-
charged for dishonesty constituting a crime 
in connection with his work as shown by 
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the facts together with his admission, or 
as shown by his conviction in a court of 
competent jurisdiction of a crime in con-
nection with that dishonesty and for the 
51 next following weeks. If by reason of 
his alleged dishonesty in connection with 
his work, the individual is held in legal 
custody or is free on bail, any determina-
tion of his eligibility shall be held in 
abeyance pending his release or conviction. 
Unemployment Insurance Rules of the Department of Employ-
ment Security, R475-5b2-5, provides as follows: 
R475-5b2-5. Benefits Held in Abeyance 
1. If the claimant has not made an admis-
sion, but is held in legal custody or free 
on bail, the law requires a withholding of 
a determination of eligibility. Benefits 
cannot be paid unless a determination of 
eligibility is made. Failure to pay bene-
fits even though the burden of proof for a 
denial under Section 5(b)(2) has not been 
met is justified because the court, in 
holding the clamant in legal custody or 
establishing bail has made a preliminary 
ruling that the state has established that 
a crime has been committed and there is 
reason to believe the individual committed 
that crime. The filing of charges is not 
the same as being held in custody. 
2. However, if there is a preponderance 
of evidence that the act was committed, a 
denial of benefits should be made under 
Section 35 - 4 - 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) , if charges have not 
been filed by the employer within four 
weeks. In such a case, the decision under 
Section 35-4-5(b)(1) will advise the claim-
ant that a decision under Section 35-4-5(b) 
(2) is still pending and the 5(b)(1) dis-
qualification shall be changed to a 5(b)(2) 
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§ 3 5 - 4 - 1 0 ( 1 ) , U t a h C o d e A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , as a m e n d e d , jirovides 
as f o l l o w s : 
10 (i ) W i t h i n t e n d a y s a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n 
of t h e b o a r d of r e v i e w h a s b e c o m e f i n a l , 
any a g g r i e v e d p a r t y may s e c u r e j u d i c i a l 
r e v i e w by c o m m e n c i n g an a c t i o n in t h e s u -
p r e m e c o u r t a g a i n s t t h e b o a r d of r e v i e w f o r 
the r e v i e w of its d e c i s i o n in w h i c h a c t i o n 
any o t h e r p a r t y to t h e p r o c e e d i n g b e f o r e 
t h e b o a r d of r e v i e w shall be m a d e a d e f e n -
d a n t . In t h a t a c t i o n a p e t i t i o n w h i c h need 
not be v e r i f i e d but must s t a t e t h e g r o u n d s 
u p o n w h i c h a r e v i e w is s o u g h t shall be 
s e r v e d u p o n a m e m b e r of t h e b o a r d of r e v i e w 
or u p o n t h a t p e r s o n t h e b o a r d of r e v i e w 
d e s i g n a t e s and s e r v i c e is d e e m e d c o m p l e t e d 
s e r v i c e on all p a r t i e s b u t t h e r e shall be 
left w i t h t h e p a r t y s e r v e d as m a n y c o p i e s 
of t h e p e t i t i o n as t h e r e a r e d e f e n d a n t s and 
the b o a r d of r e v i e w shall mail one c o p y to 
each d e f e n d a n t . W i t h its a n s w e r , t h e b o a r d 
of r e v i e w s h a l l c e r t i f y and f i l e w i t h t h e 
c o u r t all d o c u m e n t s and p a p e r s and a t r a n s -
c r i p t of all t e s t i m o n y t a k e n in t h e m a t t e r 
t o g e t h e r w i t h its f i n d i n g s of f a c t and d e -
c i s i o n . 
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3-46b~16(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1988 Replacement 
, provides as follows: 
(4) The Appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's re-
cord, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially pre-
judiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, 
is unconstitutional on its face or as ap-
plied. 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the juris-
diction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action 
were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualifi-
cati on; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a de-
termination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegat-
ed to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
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(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that deomonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; 
or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
§78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction, 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of in-
terlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final order and decrees of state 
and local agencies . . . 
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C 589 * 1325 
FORM 615-J UTAH DEPARTMENT Of EMPLOYMENT SECURITY UI -DEN 
REV. 10/85 58IN 
DECISION Of ELIGIBILITY FOR 
DISTRIBUTION; UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
#1-CL #2-C0 
*• EMPLOYER NOTIFIED ** 
EMPLOYER NAME 
SOC. SEC. #228-78-6159 LES OLSON COMPANY 
NAME AND ADDRESS OF CLAIMANT OFFICE ADDRESS 
JOHN P SHUPE Salt Lake Claims 
8592 WASATCH BLVD 1234 South Main St. 
SALT LAKE CY UT 84121 Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS FUDE ON YOUR CLAIM FOR BENEFITS: 
You were discharged from your job for insubordination or for 
inappropriate behavior which was in conflict with your employer's 
rightful interests. 
You were discharged from your job for just cause. Your conduct 
was within your control and was adverse to your employer's right-
ful interests. You had knowledge of your responsibilities to your 
employer or his expectations and you knew or should have known 
the possible adverse effects of your conduct on your employer. 
Benefits are denied under Section 35-4-5(b>(1) of the Utah Em-
ployment Security Act beginning OCTOBER 02, 1988 and ending when you 
have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at 
lease six times your weekly benefit amount and you are otherwise 
eligible. You must pros/ide proof of these earnings when you 
report to Job Service to reopen your claim. 
RIGHT TO AN INTERVIEW— If this decision was based upon written 
information only, you have the right to an in-person interview 
in a Utah Job service office within 10 calendar days of the date 
mailed. If you are filing through an office in another state, 
you may appeal as explained below but you cannot be guaranteed 
an interview on this decision. 
RI6HT TO REDETERMINATION OR APPEAL— You may request a redeter-
mination or explanation of this decision from the nearest Utah 
Job Service office within 10 calendar days. If you believe this 
decision is incorrect, you have 10 calendar days from the date 
mailed to file an appeal. Your appeal may be filed in person or 
by mail to the nearest Job Serivce office or to: Appeals Section; 
P.O. Box M600: Salt Lake City. Utah 84147. YOUR APPEAL MUST 
SHOW THE DATE WILED, YOUR NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AND 
STATE THE GROUNDS FOR YOUR APPEAL AND THE RELIEF YOU ARE 
REQUESTING. 
DATE NAILED 10/28/88 RE PR. D; Jacobs Eff>. * 4308 L.O. 21 
, ; \ ' •'. ; < J a 5 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
John P. Shupe 
8592 Wasatch Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
S.S.A. No. 228-78-6159 
Case No. 88-A-04980 
APPEAL FILED: November 2, 1988 DATE OF HEARING: November 21, 1988 
APPEARANCES: Claimant 
Claimant's Counsel 
Employer PLACE OF HEARING: Salt Lake City, UT 
The Department's decision dated October 28, 1988, denied the payment of 
unemployment insurance benefits effective October 2, 1988, and allowed the 
employer relief of charges on the grounds the claimant was discharged for just 
cause. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) and 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet. 
Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section 
35-4-6(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to filing for unemployment insurance benefits effective October 2, 1988, 
the claimant worked full time as a service technician for Les Olson Company 
from October 7, 1985 to September 26, 1988. The claimant was discharged for 
the reasons set forth as follows. 
The claimant's job entailed going to various businesses to repair copy 
machines. Service technicians are entrusted with company money and expensive 
parts. They meet and interact with company customers on a daily basis. The 
company expects trustworthiness and integrity from its employees. 
In October 1987, the claimant propositioned a fourteen year old doughnut sales 
person for sex. This was done on company property. The father of the boy 
filed a complaint. The claimant was discharged as a result but was rehired 
under three conditions. First, he was placed on a 90 day probation. Second, 
he was to seek counseling. Third, he was warned if he engaged in any similar 
activity, he would be discharged. 
The claimant passed probation. He underwent counseling for at least a year. 
A few weeks before discharge, the claimant was charged for solicitation. The 
incident occurred on State Street during his lunch hour. 
88-A-04980 
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The claimant received a subpoena to appear in court on September 14, 1988, to 
enter a plea. The claimant asked for time off work, explaining he had to 
appear in court as a witness. The employer asked the claimant if he wished to 
discuss the matter. The claimant stated "No". The claimant was given 
permission to leave. He went to court as directed. It was closed for a 
seminar. He went to the administrative offices and asked what he should do. 
He was told to call the court the next day and to ask for another court date. 
The claimant did not re-contact the court for a new date. The court sent a 
letter to the claimant advising him to reschedule. He did not receive this 
letter until September 28, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the claimant was 
arrested at work for allegedly failing to appear in court as directed. 
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1988, the claimant called the 
company for the second time that morning. He informed the employer he had been 
arrested. He explained the circumstances. When he reported to work later that 
day, he was discharged. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provide in 
pertinent part: 
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause 
for discharging the employee. In order to have just cause for discharge 
pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l), there must be fault on the part of the 
employee involved. The basic factors, as established by the Rules pertaining 
to Section 35-4-5(b)(l), which are essential for a determination of 
ineligibility under the definition of just cause are: 
B.I.a. Culpability. This is the seriousness of the misconduct 
as it affects continuance of the employment relationship. The 
discharge must have been necessary to avoid actual or potential 
harm to the employer's rightful interests, 
b. Knowledge. The employee must have had a knowledge of 
the conduct which the employer expected. 
c. Control. The control of the conduct must have been 
within the power and capacity of the claimant to control or 
prevent. 
It is unfortunate, for the claimant, that his court action c e to the 
attention of the employer. Yet, his actions toward the fourteen y. r old and 
his subsequent citation for solicitation shrouded the employer's ability to 
trust him to behave in a socially acceptable manner. The employer's reason for 
discharge was that the company's trust level in the claimant had eroded. 
Moreover, the employer was concerned the claimant might behave in a similar 
fashion with its customers. The employer did not want to risk this 
possibility. The employer's position is understandable in light of the 
claimant's past actions and after his being warned that any similar behavior 
would result in dismissal. A service company, as is Les Olson, does have the 
right to expect its service people to behave in a dignified and professional 
manner. Since the claimant's behavior shrouded the employer's trust, the 
000032 
228-78-6159 3 John P. Shupe 
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company acted reasonably by separating him. It Is held the claimant breached 
the standards of behavior the employer had a right to expect and that his 
conduct did rise to the level of knowledge, culpability and control to Impose 
a disqualification. Benefits are denied 
A contributing employer may be relieved of charges if an Individual Is 
separated for reasons held to be disqualifying. As the claimant was separated 
for disqualifying reasons, the employer 1s relieved of charges for this claim. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Department Representative denying benefits pursuant to 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed effective 
October 2, 1988, and continuing until the claimant has returned to bona fide 
covered employment and earned wages for such services equal to at least six 
times his weekly benefit amount and is otherwise eligible. 
Les Olson Company is relieved of charges for John P. Shupe pursuant to Section 
35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Act. 
LaVone Liddle-GamonaT 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision will become final unless, within ten days from November 29, 1988, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P.O. Box 11600, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
mj 
Attachment 
cc: Les Olson Company 
ATTN: Personnel Dept. 
3244 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Ward Harper, Esq. 
Utah Legal Services 
124 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-*•"* *^± *~% #"k «r* #*| 
ni I L M U 1 A Ufj i| 
BOARD OF REVIEW TRC/LLG/UMF/mgn 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
JOHN P. SHUPE 
S.S.A. No- 228 73 6159 ; 
: Case No. 88-A-4930 
: DECISION 
: Case No. 88-3R-458 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
The claimant, John P. Shupe, appeals the decision of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge affirming an earlier Department determination which 
held that the claimant was discharged from his employment for dis-
qualifying conduct pursuant to §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. The ALJ's decision therefore denied payment of benefits to 
the claimant effective October 2, 1988 and continuing until he has worked 
in bona fide covered employment and earned wages equal to at least six 
times his weekly benefit amount and is otherwise eligible. The ALJ's 
decision also relieved the employer, Les Olson Company, of liability for 
benefit charges pursuant to §35-4-7(c) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be 
a correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security 
Act, supported by competent evidence, and therefore affirms the decision. 
In so holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review notes that the claimant's actions toward the fourteen 
year old boy on the employer's premises, his subsequent citation for 
solicitation, and his failure to report to the employer that the reason 
he had to go to court was not to act as a witness but to appear as a 
defendant on a criminal charge of solicitation, yery substantially 
adversely affected the employer's ability to trust the claimant. It 
affected the employer's ability to trust the claimant in general and also 
to trust the claimant to behave in the future in a manner such as not to 
harm the reputation of the employer; or to harm the relationship of the 
employer with its customers; or to possibly render the employer liable in 
damages for the claimant's misconduct directed toward customers or other 
employees of the employer or other third parties dealing with the employer 
and coming in contact with the claimant. 
JOHN P. SHUPE 
S.S.A. No. 228 78 6159 
- 2 - Case No. 38-A-4980 
Case No. 88-BR-458 
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To 
file an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of 
the Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for 
appeal, pursuant to §63-46b-15 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
and Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a 
Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on this lT^ 
day of February, 1989 by mailing the same, postage prepaid, United States 
mail to: 
Mr. Ward Harper 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys at Law 
For: John P. Shupe 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mr. John P. Shupe 
8592 Wasatch Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Mr. R. Scott Olson, President 
Les Olson Company 
3244 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
^)yL*-+±£A^ *yULU*r*UL*toA J 
Dated th is 7th day of February, 1989. C ^ ^ > fsj» t (_^J JSJC^X 
Date Mailed: February 17, 1989. J%£*s 
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STATEMENT REGARDING CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS „ _
 n a* 
Security No. ^3^I2i£^ZSS— 7/2^ 
jrence (Enter type and date of claim). 
^a-te<rtj&/, *&&,<& [.^^d^y^^iJ^. 
^A^^^IP. 2$t£</ <„A^*c* 'SU-U&^ht? 
/
'/&r*Z*Z>b?£ /Z^ <^^< 4jZcZ^-T^r^y^ 
^ &*2£&te£s. 
I know thattne law provides penalties for falsifying statements in order to obtain benefits. I certify thatihe above 
sfetements^e true and^jbjfrecl tp4he bes^of myknowledge andl^Blle^^j^^^^ ^^;%-^^sa^^^i ; i^'^'^^^ : : : : :^^^^^ f c^^ , 
r*=3i—sr /) .DarerSigned:-
1617 
9-87 JOB 
SERVICE 
UTA. JEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECU.. 
APPEAL FROM DECISION OF REPRESENTATIVE 
"fotto P> SHupg 
CLAIMANTS NAME 
CLAIMANT'S ADDRESS 
%s±i vkwrcH $LVV>. 
STREET OR PO BOX 
Sfiir UK^UTM t^n\ 
CITY STATE ZIP 
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* m i s £/s? 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
^h-2~/0 3<o 
TELEPHONE NUMBER 
APPEAL FILED BY: 
^C la imant • Employer • 
• Check here if 
new address 
Other (specify) 
ISAGREE with the decision of a Department Representative dated L 
medl^eme^jf circle one) benefits effective date / f l ' O V o o under Section 3 D ^ T ~5[c>j[l J 
he Utah Employment Security Act. The grounds for this appeal are: 
D CLM\ be d (Aecck^s, 
QJ^SISH- 1 J U&u) * J KiHt^ 4\a£ 
VUUAJU 
e r tu<J06» 
HMJhJJL 
V&^~ " W f b l £ ^ -f-^HoXwQ^te^ A^ <3-££iU •faM- AttLLUti 
J IJ a/.t&og ~7 ^ o^( <IOMJA UxJ^u^ jztA<l<c<i c^uA atieud 
0e \Anjuutl^ \\aJi ID£€J^ JOL 
-J CA rzx&&< \ ; -
APPEALS r y 
UTAH <\7 
Weff^ 
I am requesting the following relief through this appeal: -&*\ S& S 3 Tft 
IS Allowance of unemployment benefits effective (date) ] ^ \ M j '1 * ^  ^ 
^m^ J O B * ^ * • 
• Denial of unemployment benefits effective (date)
 7 — ^ •, 
• Relief of benefit cost charges, j b ^
 w ^ ^ a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ £ ^ , J 
D Other (explain) _ > & ^ / & A ^ &C- UZUAJUUCA 4y 4 ^ 2 ^ I / I W»**-
ace your initials at the end of your statement. Use the reverse side if you need more space. This appeal can only be signed by 
e person claiming benefits, the employer, or another interested party. 
UNDERSTAND that copies of this appeal will be sent to other interested parties and that an appeal hearing will be 
;heduled if the decision is not changed by the Department review authority. n n n r i 4 A 
r N r t r t l l o n t V C i n n i f n r o D&Uv&ty Date to Department. 
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OLSON Uh, should be me. I was John's supervisor. 
DGE All right, and we'll go ahead and you're Scott Olson, is...? 
OLSON I'm Jim, James Olson. 
IDGE James Olson? 
OLSON Um-hmm. 
JDGE All right, then, go ahead, Mr. Harper. 
WPER Urn, your honor, I don't mean to waste the court's time because I realize you are 
pressed for time, but I think an opening statement in this case would, would help. 
John Shupe's job was to repair copy machines. He would travel around to different 
businesses and work on their copy machines. He was, un, he was discharged after 
being arrested on company property when he came to work and I think it's wery 
understandable why, urn, why Mr. Olson, urn, was upset at that happening. It 
certainly caused a disruption, urn, but I don't think that that, while that may 
have given him good reasons for discharging John, I don't think that it consti-
tutes just cause for denying him unemployment benefits. The crime that he was 
charged with was solicitation, urn, and the reason that he was arrested was his 
court date, he was, he had, he had a scheduled court date, he went in and the 
court was closed, they were having some seminar. So, urn, so he left. The court 
later sent him a letter saying that he should reschedule his, his hearing to 
enter his plea. But they sent him a letter on the same day that they came to 
arrest him so he neyer got it. So when he showed up for work, the police were 
there and arrested him for failure to appear on this other charge. He, he 
eventually pled guilty to a third degree misdemeanor and got a hundred dollar 
fine but at that time, he hadn't been, he hadn't been tried. The, the crime 
didn't occur on company property and it wasn't connected with his employment. 
It wasn't on the property, it wasn't at a business he was at, it was, uh, on 
State Street during his lunch hour, okay. Unfortunately, all these things, I, 
one can understand why they're very upsetting to an employer, especially perhaps 
in the state of Utah, urn, but also unfortunately that these events cost Mr. 
Shupe his job and, urn, these, this arrest was, uh, was caused by police bureau-
cracy fouling up, which was not within his control. The arrest and the events 
surrounding the arrest also don't constitute culpable acts. Certainly there was 
harm caused by police coming to the Olson's property and arresting him. There 
was probably a lot of speculation and gossip among the employees. But I, I 
think there's little reason to believe that his potential customers would find 
out. There were two other events that I believe led to Mr. Olson's decision to 
terminate John. A year ago, October 1987, a complaint was filed by the father 
of a 14-year old boy who sold, I believe, donuts or something that came around 
to the parking lot outside, outside the business and, urn, the complaint was for 
some vulgar language John was using to him and I think it was yery commendable 
of Mr. Olson not to terminate John at that time, but he allowed him to continue 
working there under two conditions; one that he seek counselling and two, that 
that sort of thing not happen again, okay. And John was in counselling for 
that entire year. He neyer let anything like that happen again. He lived up to 
those conditions. Now there is one other thing that I think led to the, to 
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Mr. Olson's decision to terminate him, was that when he was suppo-, initially 
supposed to appear in court, John lied to them. He told them that he was 
supposed to be there as a witness. And this doesn't really justify that lie 
but John felt that this thing wasn't connected to his work and also, just the 
sort of social disapproval surrounding that sort of thing, especially a com-, 
what had happened the year before, he had the feeling that he, he would be fired 
if he told them so he told them he was going to be there as a witness. After the 
police arrested him and Mr. Olson asked, asked him what had happened, after he 
figured out that this, he wasn't really supposed to be there as a witness, John 
told him the truth and he was fired. Urn, now, unfortunately, the, I think these 
sorts of events reflect something sort of odd about our own society and that is 
the sort of over-emphasis on, on sex, even victimless crimes are often punished, 
urn, and I think that really, the, the part of the, the part of the unemployment 
rules that was designed to deal with that, with that sort of thing, where there's 
huge social disapproval and it's such that we make something a crime, is really 
5(b)(2) and I think that that section requires not only that the crime be connec-
ted, urn, be committed in connection with work but also that it include a criminal 
act involving dishonesty and I don't think either of those things can be shown in 
this case. 
JUDGE Thank you. And which one of you gentlemen wishes to testify first? 
J.OLSON I will. 
JUDGE Would you raise your r ight hand to be sworn? 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE OATH. WITNESS ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY. 
JUDGE Thank you, s i r , i f you'd state your name and posit ion for the record? 
J.OLSON Uh, James R. Olson, general service manager. 
JUDGE And the name of the company? 
J.OLSON Les Olson Company. 
JUDGE And i t s address? 
J.OLSON 3244 South 300 West, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah. 
JUDGE And the zip code? 
J.OLSON 84115. 
JUDGE Al l r i g h t . Were you the d i rect supervisor of Mr. Shupe? 
J.OLSON Uh, yes , I was h i s , uh, he ac tua l ly was supervised by Duane Anderson, whom I 
supervise as my Sharp service manager. 
JUDGE So you were the second level? 
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3LS0N Yes. 
D6E Al1 r i g h t . Are you t e s t i f y i n g from, in terms of the separat ion, from f i rs t -hand 
knowledge or from what others have t o l d you? 
OLSON First-hand knowledge. 
D6E Al l r i g h t . We show that Mr. Shupe was employed with the company from October 7, 
1985 to September 26th of ' 88 , are we correct? 
OLSON Yes. 
IDGE And his job title when he left? 
OLSON Ser-, uh, service technician. 
IDGE And his rate of pay? 
.OLSON Uh, $800 a month base salary plus commissions. 
.OLSON $850 a month. 
.OLSON $850, yeah, I'm sorry. 
JDGE And was this a full or part time position? 
.OLSON Full. 
JDGE What caused this job to end, was this a quit or a discharge? 
.OLSON Well, it was, uh, he was terminated. 
UDGE What were the circumstances? 
.OLSON Basically, uh, according to the opening statement. I received a call, well, to 
start it out, I arrived to work the day that John was terminated and there was 
a police officer waiting in the parking lot and, being curious, I went over and 
asked him if I could help him and he said no, he was waiting here for John Shupe. 
That's none of my business so I went in the, my office and began work and of 
course like, uh, has already been stated, there was a lot of talk of what's he 
here for? What's going on? And I just, you know, tried to direct the day's work 
like normal. Uh, shortly after 8:00, I got a call or it might have almost been 
9:00, I believe, I'm not exactly sure of the exact time but I received a call 
from John saying that he had overslept. He'd been previously warned, uh, or 
cautioned, you know, you need to be on time. We'd talked several months earlier 
about that. He'd had a problem with that and it repeated that morning. At that 
time I didn't say anything about the police waiting in the parking lot or anything 
like that and the next thing I knew I got a call from John approximately 11:00, 
I think, can't remember the exact time again but, uh, stating that he'd been 
arrested and stating the, what was going on. From, uh, that point, he, little 
vague on what time he got back to the office but at that point, he was let go. 
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He asked at tha t po in t , "Why am I being f i r e d for what happened today?" And at 
that point , I had to ld him no, i t ' s an accumulation of th ings, uh, the main 
reason being t h a t , uh, he wasn't honest with me about what had happened. Al l of 
our employees in John's posit ion cdirry a large amount, not a large amount, but a, 
probably a couple thousand dol lars worth of suppl ies, par ts , tools with them and 
where he was deal ing with our customers, you know, out in the f i e l d , on his own, 
and, uh, with a l l of the s t u f f we were putt ing in his care, I jus t f e l t l i k e i f 
he'd l i ed to me about th is kind of t h i n g , what else might he l i e to me about, you 
know. 
JUDGE What did he l i e to you about? 
J.OLSON Wel l , he s ta ted , uh, o r i g i n a l l y , when he came to me, he mentioned, l i k e has alrea( 
been s ta ted , t h a t , uh, he had to appear in court as a witness and I says, "Oh, do 
you want to t e l l me about i t ? " And he said no. Of course, I d idn ' t pry or ask 
any more about i t a n d . . . 
JUDGE When was t h i s stated to you? 
J.OLSON Uh, t h i s would've been, oh, several days before he had, uh, asked for the time 
o f f , which has already been s t a t e d , I t h i n k , today. I can' t remember the date 
t h a t , u h . . . 
JUDGE Was th is a few days before separation o r . . . ? 
J.OLSON No, th is would've been several weeks, I be l i eve . Possibly longer, a l i t t l e b i t 
longer than t h a t , but he'd asked, sa id , " I need th is time of f to go appear as a 
witness," and of course, we l e t him go. Uh, he a c t u a l l y , I guess, went to be the 
witness, the court was closed, he s t i l l ended up taking a substantial amount of 
time o f f , uh, possibly several hours, from what I was to ld by his supervisor, uh, 
Duane Anderson. And come to f ind out he ne^er did go to the , uh, to the court . 
So at that p o i n t , uh, you know, I wasn't aware that he never went to the court , 
but then, uh, the policeman came and a l l of what's already been mentioned t rans -
pired where he was ar res ted , taken to j a i l , came back and we talked about i t and 
I found out he'd l i e d to me, you know, . . . 
JUDGE Lied to you about the previous court date? 
J.OLSON Yes, saying t h a t , uh, he'd had to appear as a witness when in a l l ac tua l i ty i t 
was a charge against himself . And I just f e l t l i k e we could no longer t rus t John 
with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and the products we were putting under his care. 
JUDGE Anything else you wish to add or state? 
J.OLSON No. 
CLAIMANT Could I make a . . . 
JUDGE Not r ight now. This gentleman is t e s t i f y i n g . Any questions you have of th is 
person, Mr. Harper? 
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IRPER Did you, did you have complaints with customers about John's dishonesty? 
.OLSON I hadn't in the past , no. 
(RPER Did you make any ca l l s to see i f he had performed some dishonest acts with regard 
to them? 
OLSON No, I f e l t l i k e what I 'd received from him at work was su f f i c ien t for my needs. 
R^PER Now, now a f te r t h i s incident of the previous year , I imagine that you were, urn, 
you were watching him pret ty c l o s e l y , weren't you? 
.OLSON No, no more than I would anybody e lse . I always t r y to be as f a i r as possible. 
WPER Okay, but you d i d n ' t , you d i d n ' t , you haven't noticed any other signs of dishonesty 
other than, than t h e , than ly ing about being a witness? 
.OLSON I r e a l l y f e l t okay with John. 
WPER I have nothing e l s e . 
JD6E Thank you. I thank you for your testimony, and do you need to give some addi-
t iona l testimony? 
.OLSON I 'd l i k e t h a t . 
JDGE Would you r a i s e your r i g h t hand? 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE OATH. WITNESS ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY. 
JDGE Thank y o u , s i r . I f y o u ' d s t a t e your name and p o s i t i o n w i t h the company? 
.OLSON S c o t t O lson, I 'm personnel d i r e c t o r , manager a t Les Olson Company i n S a l t Lake 
City. 
JDGE A l l r i g h t . 
.OLSON And I want t o r e f e r back t o Mr . H a r p e r ' s opening s t a t e m e n t . I t was, represented 
t h e f a c t s f a i r l y a c c u r a t e l y . I ' d l i k e t o discuss some of the t h i n g s t h a t happened 
a y e a r ago when John was brought i n f o r t a l k i n g t o the donut salesman and I 'm not 
doing t h i s t o b r i n g up any bad b l o o d , John , but t h a t , i n my memory, has t o be one 
of t h e most g r u e l i n g i n t e r v i e w s t h a t we've ever had w i t h an employee. There were 
s e v e r a l of us i n v o l v e d i n t h a t and we t e r m i n a t e d John a t t h a t t i m e . John l i t e r a l l y 
p led t o the company f o r h i s j o b and, u h , we, u h , somehow we, our hear ts were 
touched by t h a t and we s a i d , John , we w i l l keep you on the basis t h a t Mr. Harper 
a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d , t h a t number one, he r e c e i v e c o u n s e l l i n g f o r i t , and I pe rsona l l y 
f o l l o w e d through w i t h John t o see t h a t t h i s happened and apparen t ly i t had; number 
t w o , he was p laced on p r o b a t i o n f o r 90 days t h a t i f any act of misconduct we 
indicated to him that he would be terminated; and th irdly , he was warned that i f 
any act that even resembled this type of incident occurred again in the future, 
he would be terminated immediately. And the charge that was, uh, put against 
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John by this donut salesman's father is that he had propositioned him, quote 
unquote, for sex, a young man. And at that time, it was wery difficult to, tc 
get John to speak about it, to feel like he was telling us the truth, and it was 
only until his job was on the line that he finally discussed what actually he hac 
said and even at that point, I'm not sure that we received the truth but our 
hearts were moved by the plea that John made for his job and, and therefore, we., 
uh, we did allow him to stay on under those conditions. When this second incident 
occurred, we, uh, we, as an employer, I just want to make a statement about out 
role as an employer in the thing, we didn't feel like we could afford the potentia1 
liability that we might have because if he was, if these types of acts wen 
occurring again, we didn't know whether he might be in a customer's office ai 
some point in time and, uh, do something inappropriate there. We just didn'1 
feel like we could take that liability, so along with what Jim has indicated, uh 
the liability that we felt as an employer to have an employee like that, uh 
whether he-, whether the charge had been proved or not, the fact that a charge 
had been levelled and the second time, uh, we didn't feel like we could be liabT 
for that so... 
JUDGE Thank you. Mr. Harper, any questions you have? 
HARPER I have no questions. 
JUDGE Thank you. Then I'll take your testimony, sir. Would you raise your right hand 
to be sworn? 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE OATH. CLAIMANT ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. 
JUDGE Thank you, sir. If you'd state your name and current mailing address for the 
record? 
CLAIMANT It's John Phillip Shupe. My address is 8592 Wasatch Blvd., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
JUDGE And your zip code is 84121? 
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Al1 right, and the last place that you worked prior to f i l i ng for benefits, was 
that Les Olson? 
CLAIMANT Yes, ma'am. 
JUDGE And you've heard the employer state your dates of employment, the type of work 
you were doing, hours and wage. Is that correct to the best of your knowledge 
CLAIMANT That's correct. 
JUDGE And would you agree that this is a discharge rather than a quit? 
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Thank you. Go ahead, Mr. Harper. 
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RPER John, would you describe the events that led to your arrest and what happened 
after that? 
AIMANT Well, as I had indicated before, I, I was served a subpoena by the South Salt 
Lake Police Department to appear in court on the 14th of September for the charge 
of prostitution or solicitation of sex. Now I'd, as Jim said, I told him that I 
had to appear as a witness that day because I felt that I could take care of this 
matter without involving the company and without, other than taking a couple hours 
off to go to court, I felt like I had, that it would not involve the company's 
time beyond that. Urn, I talked to a lawyer and I was told that, with my previous 
clean record, the worst that would happen would be I would get a fine so I felt 
that because I was not going to have to go to jail, that I would not be taking 
away anything from my employer as far as my commitment to, you know, 40-hour week. 
Now, when I went to court that day, I told my boss, Jim Olson, that I had to appear 
as a witness. Obviously, that's not true, but I said that because I didn't really 
want to tell him what was really going on because I felt that I could take care of 
it and it would be out of the way and no one really had to know about it. Urn, in 
hindsight, I almost, you know, • could've just as easily said I had a doctor's 
appointment or something rather than have to explain why I have to go to court 
but I really didn't want to lie to them, you know, I, I felt that, you know, having 
to go to court was a bad enough deal and for me to have to lie and say that I was 
doing something else would just be making it worse. So I told Jim that I had to 
go to court but I said it was as a witness. And when I went to court that morning, 
uh, there was a sign on the door which said that the courtroom was going to be 
closed all day. I went upstairs to the administrative offices and I asked the 
secretaries there what was going on. I explained that I had been served a subpoena 
telling me to appear in court on that day and they said that the court was closed 
all day because of a seminar and that I, in fact, should've never been scheduled 
for that date. Now, I was, I told them well, what am I suppos-, or I asked them, 
what am I supposed to do and she said well, that I should call the next day and 
ask the court, you know, when I would be appointed another date. Well, I did not 
do that. That was probably my, my single greatest mistake in this whole affair 
because if I had called and if I had set up another date, I could1 ve probably 
taken care of this whole incident without involving either my company or the police 
but I guess in a yery foolish way, I was hoping that perhaps since they'd made the 
mistake of scheduling me for that day to begin with that perhaps they would forget 
about the whole thing, you know. In hindsight, that was wery poor judgement on 
my part because if I had in fact called and made another appointment, they probably, 
everything that's happened here could've been avoided. But I thought perhaps 
nothing would become of it and it wasn't until the 26th of September, Monday 
morning, when I was arrested on company property, that I received any sort of 
notification from the justice system from the courts or the police. Urn, I received 
a letter, which I have with me if the court would like to see it, dated that same 
morning, which I received two days later on the 28th of September telling me that 
because I had failed to appear in court that I was subject to arrest. Now 
obviously I had no chance to act on that request because in fact I was arrested 
that same day and I explained to the arresting officer that I had appeared in court 
and the court had been closed. He checked the records right then and verified 
that in fact the court had been closed that day and that I was telling the truth 
in that regard. But he said that I should've followed up on it so therefore, in 
his way of looking at it, it was half the court's fault and half my fault. And 
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expecting grave consequences for what had transpired. In my, my reason fo 
making this claim, or, or for appealing the original decision is not so muc 
that I have any quarrel or disagreement with my employer. Under the circum 
stances, I do believe that they had a good reason to let me go. However, I fee 
that the court system, uh, the court is responsible for what, for my losing m 
job more than anyone. Now I realize I can't really, it's hard to, to try t 
blame the courts, but in fact, because of the way they handled my quote failur 
to appeal, or failure to appear in court, that this whole matter resulted 
JUDGE Anything further, Mr. Harper? 
HARPER Urn, where, where did, urn, the initial crime take place? 
CLAIMANT It was on State Street. 
HARPER And, and what time was this? 
CLAIMANT It was about noon. 
HARPER Okay, urn, what were you doing at the time? 
CLAIMANT I was on my lunch hour. 
HARPER I, I have nothing else, your honor. 
JUDGE Al1 right, am I correct then you were working that particular day but you were off 
work for lunch at that time? 
CLAIMANT Yes, I have an hour for lunch. 
JUDGE Al 1 right. Apparently, you sought some counselling, is that correct? 
CLAIMANT Yes, I have been seeing a counsellor on a regular basis. 
JUDGE Okay, and you're continuing with that? 
CLAIMANT Uh, actually I stopped that after my termination, uh, partly because the, the waj< 
it was set up, uh, Les Olson medical insurance company paid for half of the charge 
urn, from the, the counselling, and I paid the other half and, but after losing n 
job, I no longer have any medical benefits so therefore the insurance compar 
would not, at least, I, I thought the insurance company would not continue to pa 
the other half so I have not seen the counsellor since then. 
JUDGE Okay, that's enough. Mr. Harper, are there any medical grounds to establish, uh, 
lack of control, so perhaps the employer could be relieved of charges, to yoi 
knowledge? 
HARPER Urn, not that I'm aware of. Let me,... 
JUDGE Do you want to confer with your client? 
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DECISION 
Case No. 38-3R-458 
The claimant, John P. Shupe, appeals the decision of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge affirming an earlier Department determination which 
held that the claimant was discharged from his employment for dis-
qualifying conduct pursuant to §35-4-5(5)(1) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. The ALJ's decision therefore denied payment of benefits to 
the claimant effective October 2, 1988 and continuing until he has worked 
in bona fide covered employment and earned wages equal to at least six 
times his weekly benefit amount and is otherwise eligible. The ALJ's 
decision also relieved the employer, Les Olson Company, of liability for 
benefit charges pursuant to §35-4-7(c) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be 
a correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security 
Act, supported by competent evidence, and therefore affirms the decision. 
In so holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review notes that the claimant's actions toward the fourteen 
year old boy on the employer's premises, his subsequent citation for 
solicitation, and his failure to report to the employer that the reason 
he had to go to court was not to act as a witness but to appear as a 
defendant on a criminal charge of solicitation, \/ery substantially 
adversely affected the employer's ability to trust the claimant. It 
affected the employer's ability to trust the claimant in general and also 
to trust the claimant to behave in the future in a manner such as not to 
harm the reputation of the employer; or to harm the relationship of the 
employer with its customers; or to possibly render the employer liable in 
damages for the claimant's misconduct directed toward customers or other 
employees of the employer or other third parties dealing with the employer 
and coming in contact with the claimant. 
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